Realpolitik and Ukraine

In an interview published in The New Yorker on March 1 John Mearsheimer said that recent Ukrainian governmental administrations misled the country by fostering ideas of NATO and European Union membership. These ideas were unrealistic and, in fact, dangerous for Ukrainians, within the context of Great Power realpolitik.

The following is condensed and paraphrased from that interview.

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John Mearsheimer is a proponent of the analytical perspective of great-power politics — a school of realist interpretation of international relations that assumes that, in a self-interested attempt to preserve national security, states will preëmptively act in anticipation of adversaries. For years, Mearsheimer has argued that the US, in pushing to expand NATO eastward and establishing friendly relations with Ukraine, has increased the likelihood of war and laid the groundwork for Vladimir Putin’s aggressive position toward Ukraine. Indeed, in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, Mearsheimer wrote that “the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for this crisis” due to their provocative NATO-expansionist policies.

Q. Looking at the situation now with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world got here?

A. I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where afterward a statement was issued that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West, to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border.

NATO expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy. From a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat.

When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States.

Under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine, there’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country. The US overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave.

In regard to the idea that Putin is an aggressor, that was a story that we invented so that we could blame him for the Crimean takeover in 2014. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anyone in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

Q. You say you’re doubtful that Putin wants to absorb all of Ukraine or any other countries in Eastern Europe.

A. I don’t believe he wants to conquer all of Ukraine or turn to the Baltic states, in order to create a greater Russia or the reincarnation of the Soviet Union. It’s difficult to tell, looking at the maps of the ongoing conflict, exactly what he’s up to. It seems quite clear to me that he is going to take the Donbass and that the Donbass is going to be either two independent states or one big independent state, but beyond that it’s not clear what he’s going to do. I mean, it does seem apparent that he’s not touching western Ukraine.

Q. His bombs are touching it, right?

A. But the key issue is: What territory does he want to hold on to?

I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory in eastern Ukraine. Other than that he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. I think he’s interested in taking Kyiv temporarily for the purpose of regime change, but not permanent conquest.

I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American.

I think Putin understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He wants to take some territory, in addition to what happened with Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions for him to try to conquer all of Ukraine.

To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today.

Q. What do you think we should be doing?

We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers — China, Russia, and the United States — and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

Anyway, in an ideal world, it would be wonderful if the Ukrainians were free to choose their own political system and to choose their own foreign policy. But in the real world, that is not feasible. The Ukrainians have a vested interest in paying serious attention to what the Russians want from them. They run a grave risk if they alienate the Russians in a fundamental way. If Russia thinks that Ukraine presents an existential threat to Russia because it is aligning with the United States and its West European allies, this is going to cause an enormous amount of damage to Ukraine. That of course is exactly what’s happening now. So my argument is: the strategically wise strategy for Ukraine is to break off its close relations with the West, especially with the United States, and try to accommodate the Russians.

If there had been no decision to move NATO eastward to include Ukraine, then Crimea and the Donbass would be part of Ukraine today, and there would be no war in Ukraine.

I think there’s a possibility that the Ukrainians can work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. And the reason is that the Russians are now discovering that occupying Ukraine and trying to run Ukraine’s politics is asking for big trouble.

Q. So you are saying occupying Ukraine is going to be a tough slog?

A. Absolutely, and that’s why I said that I do not think the Russians will occupy Ukraine in the long term. They’re going to try to take at least the Donbass, but I think they’re too smart to get involved in an occupation of Ukraine.